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INTRODUCTION
In his provocative article, Crime, Surveillance and Communities,
Professor I. Bennett Capers argues, contrary to Supreme Court
precedent, that camera surveillance of public spaces is a Fourth
Amendment search.1 But he also argues that such surveillance should
be permitted even in the absence of probable cause, so long as it is
“reasonable.”2 His third contention is that reasonableness analysis in
this context ought to take into account not only the extent to which
cameras can prevent crime, but also the extent to which the
community will benefit from the ability of the cameras to deter police
brutality and document evidence of racial profiling and other abuses
of discretion.3 Professor Capers hypothesizes that this ability to
monitor the police will enhance government legitimacy and thus
cooperation with the police.4 I have three observations about his
article, corresponding to the three main threads of his argument.

* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School
1. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 959 (2013).
2. Id. at 975.
3. Id. at 978, 986.
4. Id. at 978, 987–88.
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I. IS CAMERA SURVEILLANCE A SEARCH?
First, Professor Capers argues that people should be able to expect
privacy even in public, based on what he calls a “nonconventional
reading” of the Fourth Amendment.5 He points out that many of the
Court’s cases, from Katz v. United States6 onward, suggest that
surreptitious eavesdropping of conversations—even those that occur
in public—is a Fourth Amendment search when none of the parties to
the conversation consents to the eavesdropping and no one else is in a
position to hear it with the naked ear.7 Based on that case law, he
contends, “citizens are not required to assume the risk that they will
be monitored by a watching device when no duplicitous eye is
actually present.”8
There are two possible problems with this analysis. First, of course,
in most situations involving camera surveillance, members of the
public will be able to view with the naked eye what the camera sees.
Even on streets that tend to be largely abandoned, a few people are
usually about, which presumably would mean that human eyes,
duplicitous or not, are often present. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has been quite willing to assume that members of the public
could have seen what police technology observes even when that
conclusion requires a heavy dose of imagination. For instance, in its
“flyover” cases, the Court has held that no search occurs even when
the police use airplanes and powerful cameras to spy on curtilage,
much less the public streets, on the theory that any member of the
public could have done the same thing.9 And the Court has been
willing to reach this conclusion even when, in fact, members of the
general public are not likely to be flying as low as the police did in
these cases, not likely to possess magnification devices of the type the
police possessed, and not likely to be as interested in the particular
property the police targeted.

5. Id. at 969.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. See Capers, supra note 1, at 970–73 (discussing United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745 (1971) and Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)).
8. Id. at 974.
9. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (no search when police
spy on a backyard from a helicopter hovering 400 yards above ground); Dow Chem.
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 243 n.4 (1986) (no search occurs when
government spies on business curtilage from an airplane in navigable airspace, using
a $22,000 mapping camera); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 215 (1986) (no
search when police use a plane to spy on a backyard surrounded by a ten-foot high
fence).
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Second, even if this initial hurdle to applying the “uninvited ear”
cases to camera surveillance can be overcome (perhaps on the ground
that no one could possibly have seen whatever the camera captures),
the analogy fails because a properly operated camera system would
put pedestrians on notice that it is there. Notice is not only a sensible
aspect of a surveillance regime designed to deter, but is also
constitutionally required under the Supreme Court’s cases.10 If such
notice exists, neither surreptitious nor duplicitous ‘Peeping Tom-ism’
can occur.11
If camera surveillance is a search, it is because, as I have previously
argued, a right to anonymity in public exists even when the
government gives notice of its intent to watch.12 That right is based
on a due process right to locomotion,13 a First Amendment right to
association and expression,14 and, most importantly, a Fourth
Amendment right to feel secure from unjustified government
observation of daily activities15—the latter an interest that has been
rejuvenated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States
v. Jones.16 Camera surveillance is a form of government stalking that
should not take place simply because the government has the
resources to engage in it.
II. WHEN SHOULD CAMERA SURVEILLANCE BE AUTHORIZED?
Although we get there by different paths, Professor Capers and I
agree that camera surveillance is a search. I also agree with Professor
Capers that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant or
probable cause for such surveillance.17 Professor Capers is not
entirely clear as to why he would relax these traditional protections,
10. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 126–27 (2007) (citing Supreme Court
cases that emphasize how notice helps justify government searches).
11. As I noted in PRIVACY AT RISK, notice does not equate with real consent, but
it does alert people to the fact that “they are being watched so that they can act
accordingly.” Id. at 127.
12. See id. at 90–92 (describing a right to public anonymity).
13. See id. at 101–04.
14. See id. at 98–101.
15. See id. at 106–08.
16. In United States v. Jones, five Justices of the Court indicated that prolonged
technological tracking of a car on public thoroughfares should be considered a
Fourth Amendment search. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J. concurring).
17. Capers, supra note 1, at 975 (arguing that “[s]everal factors suggest that
reasonableness will suffice” in connection with analyzing camera surveillance).
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although he seems to fasten on the idea that the Supreme Court’s
special needs jurisprudence might apply.18 The problem with that
approach is that, to date, the Court claims to resort to special needs
analysis only when something other than ordinary criminal law
enforcement is involved,19 which is a difficult argument to make when
camera surveillance is involved. The primary goal of camera
surveillance, after all, is to deter and detect criminals.
My rationale for relaxing Fourth Amendment strictures on camera
surveillance varies, depending on whether the issue is when cameras
may be used to target someone or instead when a camera system may
be set up in the first instance. On the first issue, my rationale for
relaxing Fourth Amendment strictures is based on proportionality
reasoning.
Although even short-term surveillance can chill
locomotion, speech, and association and undermine security, it is not
as invasive as many other types of physical or virtual searches.20 Thus,
targeted camera surveillance that is not prolonged should be
permitted on less than probable cause. Specifically, I recently
proposed that probable cause should be required only if targeted
public surveillance lasts longer than two days (in the aggregate), while
reasonable suspicion would justify surveillance lasting between 20
minutes and two days, and shorter surveillance would be permitted to
achieve any legitimate law enforcement objective.21
Of course, targeted surveillance can only take place if a camera
system exists, which raises the second issue flagged above—under
what circumstances may government establish a camera system? I
agree with Professor Capers that the decision to set up such a system
must take community views into account.22 However, relying on
political process theory, I have argued that those views need to be

18. Id. at 975 (“[S]uch surveillance responds to special needs beyond law
enforcement . . . .”).
19. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (holding that a
roadblock set up to detect narcotics trafficking was aimed at meeting the needs of
ordinary law enforcement and thus required individualized suspicion). Although
Professor Capers states that cameras are also set up to protect the public and thus can
be justified on special needs grounds, that reasoning could have applied just as easily
to the roadblock that was found unconstitutional in Edmond. See Capers, supra note
1, at 975.
20. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 111–12 (reporting research on lay views
about intrusiveness of cameras).
21. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUBLIC POL’Y 24 (2012).
22. Capers, supra note 1, at 977 (advocating “listening to communities”).
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discovered and implemented in a particular way.23 Specifically, group
surveillance systems of the type at issue here must be approved
legislatively, by a truly representative body, and must ensure that the
surveillance is not targeted at any one person, group, or locale unless
the suspicion required for such targeting exists.24 Under this scheme,
if a neighborhood council approves a camera system for that
neighborhood after meaningful consultation with the affected
populace, a camera system would be permitted. If, in contrast, a citywide or state legislative body authorizes localized camera systems
without the democratic consent of those affected, law enforcement
should have to provide data showing that the monitored areas in fact
experience high levels of crime.25
III. SHOULD TECHNOLOGY’S CAPACITY TO DETER POLICE
ABUSE FACTOR INTO REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS?
Professor Capers argues that, in deciding whether surveillance is
permissible and for how long, courts and communities should look
not only at whether the surveillance might reduce crime but also
whether it can enhance the government’s legitimacy by monitoring
police behavior.26 I agree that technologically monitoring police
behavior is a good idea as a deterrent and as a legitimacy-enhancing
device. But I am not sure that we need camera systems—that is,
cameras on telephone poles and buildings panning city thoroughfares
twenty-four hours a day—to do it. If the goal is to make sure that we
know what the police are up to, the best technological fix is to equip
them with head- or badge-cams, devices already used in some
jurisdictions.27 That maneuver would avoid overbroad surveillance
that captures the activities of everyone on the street; instead it would
focus on those people that the police single out.
23. Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 143 (2010) (summarizing political process theory’s application to the Fourth
Amendment).
24. Id. at 132–36 (providing examples of how political process theory would
work); see also, Slobogin, supra note 21, at 31–32 (same).
25. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 138–41 (providing examples of data-driven group
surveillance). See also Slobogin, supra note 21, at 32 (providing additional examples).
26. Capers, supra note 1, at 978 (“Public surveillance can also function to monitor
the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police brutality, and ultimately increase
perceptions of legitimacy.”).
27. See David Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as
Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by the Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 357, 359–60 (2010) (touting head cams as a method of monitoring police
conduct).
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The body-camera fix would also avoid forcing a Hobson’s choice
on the community. A citizenry that is bothered by police misconduct
may well agree to undergo surveillance simply to make sure police
abuse is deterred. What the community might really want, however,
is both less abusive policing and less surveillance of its everyday,
innocent activities. Body cameras can accommodate both objectives.
At the least, a court should not be able to override a community’s
veto of a camera system on the ground that the system is needed to
monitor police conduct.
CONCLUSION
Professor Capers’s article helps stimulate thinking about the way in
which community views and individual rights interact. In my view,
where police propose to conduct surveillance of groups, as occurs
with camera surveillance (including the newly developing drone
camera systems)28, the affected group should be heavily involved in
the authorization process. If the surveillance is authorized, care must
be taken to ensure that all members of the group are equally affected
by it unless and until individualized suspicion, proportionate to the
intrusion, develops. That formula ensures that the interests of both
the collective and the individual are protected.

28. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R42701.pdf (reporting that the FAA predicts that over 30,000 drones will be
flying over domestic airspace within the next twenty years, potentially equipped with
“high-powered cameras, thermal imaging devices, license-plate readers, and laser
radar (LADAR)”).

